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1  What is representationalism? 
What do I mean by representationalism? The label is currently used for a con-
fusing variety of distinct positions. Let me distinguish my target from two of 
these. What I do not mean is the idea that philosophy can investigate the capac-
ity of mind and/or language to acquire knowledge about a mind-independent 
reality. Representationalism in this sense has been vociferously opposed by 
Rorty (1979), to the common acclaim of literary critics, social theorists and so-
called continental philosophers, and to the widespread dismay of many analytic 
philosophers. Nor do I mean the view that a systematic theory of meaning for a 
specific (natural) language specifies the truth-conditions of sentences of that 
language. Representationalism in this sense contrasts, for instance, with the 
kind of inferentialist semantics propounded by Brandom (1994). 
 My target is neither as specific as the second position nor quite as general 
and diffuse as the first. For my purposes, representationalism has been summa-
rized neatly by Fodor: ‘the mind is pre-eminently the locus of mental represen-
tation and mental causation’ (2003: 8). It is a ‘representational system’, and 
thinking is ‘representing things in the world’ (Crane 2004). Representationalism 
thus understood is part of the mainstream of modern philosophy. In the wake of 
Descartes, ‘mind’, its equivalents and cognates have been treated as the label of 
a special kind of thing or realm—whether it be the mind of Cartesian dualists or 
the brain of materialist monists. Prominent among the denizens inhabiting this 
realm are cogitationes, ideas, Vorstellungen, etc., which both represent and are 
caused by phenomena—objects, facts, etc.—in the material world. 
 Especially in the empiricist ‘way of ideas’, these mental proxies tended to be 
conceived of as images of the kind that occur to us when we imagine a visible 
phenomenon. But there is also a version of representationalism that is lingualist 
rather than imagist and conceives of them as symbolic in nature, as in William 
of Occam. A transmuted contemporary version of the imagist brand is the idea 
of ‘nonconceptual content’ (e.g. Cussins 1992; Peacocke 1992; Bermúdez 2003. 
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cp. Glock 2013a: 222). It holds that at least some kinds of representations—
notably those involved in animal thinking and pre-reflective human percep-
tion—are ‘proto-propositional’ and consist of nonconceptual components. 
 I shall concentrate the mainstream of representationalism within analytic 
philosophy, which is of the lingualist type. According to this orthodoxy, inten-
tional verbs like ‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘perceive’, ‘desire’, ‘intend’ etc. signify pro-
positional attitudes, i.e. relations between a subject and a (propositional) ‘con-
tent’ or thought, a complex entity which has concepts as components.1 As will 
become abundantly clear in the sequel, I regard this orthodoxy as mistaken and 
the terminology as misleading. Therefore I shall refer to intentional states as 
thought and employ ‘thinking’ or ‘having thoughts’ in the sense of being in an 
intentional state. This terminology is in line with Hume (1740: 1.3.16) and 
Davidson (1984: 156; 2001:98-100). 
 The most prominent contemporary manifestation of representationalism, 
and one of the clearest, is Fodor’s representational theory of mind (RTM). Inten-
tional states like belief and desire ‘are constituted by relations to mental repre-
sentations’, namely ‘thoughts’ (Fodor 2003: 141, 10). Concepts are ‘the constitu-
ents of thoughts’ (Fodor 1998: 25). Thoughts and concepts constitute types of 
‘mental representation’ and a ‘kind of mental particular’. As mental particulars, 
they are ‘objects in the mind’ or ‘in the head’ of individuals; they are ‘concrete’ 
rather than abstract; and they have causes and effects in the physical world 
(Fodor 1998: 3, 7-8, 22; 2003: 13+n). As mental representations, they have ‘repre-
sentational content’. They contribute to the content of our intentional states, to 
what we believe, desire etc. They do so by determining the conditions under 
which our beliefs are true and our desires satisfied. 
 Furthermore, according to Fodor’s ‘language of thought hypothesis’ mental 
representations are symbolic rather than iconic. External sentences are mean-
ingful because they are correlated with internal signs, sentence-like representa-
tions in the brain the tokening of which constitutes our thinking (believing, 
desiring, etc.). The ultimate carriers of intentional content are sentences in 
‘Mentalese’, physical tokens of computational types. When we engage in con-
ceptual thought, Mother Nature inscribes signs of a computer programme into 
our brains. Concepts, according to Fodor, are nothing other than the token-
words of the language of thought, and thoughts are its token-sentences. 
|| 
1 See, e.g., Frege 1918; Russell 1940; Moore 1962: ch. 3; Price 1969; Burge 2005. I shall not 
dwell on the major schism within this branch of representationalism, namely between those 
who regard representations as Fregean senses and those who regard them as structured propo-
sitions à la Russell. But it will make a brief appearance in section 5. 
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 The current representationalist orthodoxy involves three distinct elements: 
a relational model: an intentional state is a relation between a subject and a 
content, something the intentional state is directed at; 
propositionalism: these contents are propositions; 
a building-block model: propositions are (abstract) wholes which have (ab-
stract) parts—concepts.2 
I shall argue against all three components. First, many intentional constructions 
do not take the form ‘V-ing that p’, and cannot be reduced to anything ‘that-ish’. 
Secondly, even that-ish intentional states like believing or desiring that p are 
not uniformly attitudes towards propositions. Thirdly, what we think—the ‘con-
tents’ of our thinking—are not complex entities with concepts as components. 
As a result, thinking should not even be regarded as a bona fide relation or atti-
tude.3 
2  Against universal propositionalism 
Some contemporaries would have us believe that the philosophy of mind 
should take its lead exclusively from the cognitive sciences. But our pre-
theoretical mental concepts determine the topic both of the cognitive sciences 
and the philosophy of mind, and they are embodied in the way we use mental 
terms, or, more generally, in our mental discourse (see Glock 2013b). For this 
reason, I shall approach the question of whether propositionalism holds for all 
|| 
2 Thus for Burge representations are tokened, structured, instances of inner symbols, 
expressing representational contents (Burge 2005: 67). Perception is representational in 
that it purports to be about something and to represent it as being a certain way (Burge 
2005: 3). 
3 Non representationalist approaches in philosophy include eliminativism, behaviourism, and 
instrumentalism. Non-representationalist approaches in cognitive science include behaviour-
based robotics and Dynamic System Theory. Ryder 2009 surveys these positions from a repre-
sentationalist point of view. There is also a distinguished group of Neo-Aristotelians and Witt-
gensteinians that repudiates representationalism, including Brandom, Hacker, Kenny and 
McDowell. Several of my animadversions to representationalism are indebted to Kenny and 
Hacker in particular. But others are inspired by neo-Fregean and instrumentalist ideas, notably 
the repetition problem diagnosed by Künne and the measurement analogy deriving from 
Davidson (see scts. 4-5 below). Moreover, none of the declared critics of representationalism 
distinguish its three components; indeed, some of them—including Kenny and McDowell—
subscribe to propositionalism. 
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types of intentional states (all forms of thinking) through looking at our em-
ployment of intentional verbs, verbs ascribing intentional states. 
Intentional verbs occur mainly in three sentential forms: 
I A Vs (thinks/believes/expects, etc.) that p 
II A Vs (intends/plans/means, etc.) to  
III A Vs (loves/desires/thinks about, etc.) X 
According to the aforementioned orthodoxy, the verbs that can replace ‘V’ de-
note different types of intentional attitudes, ‘A’ the subject of these attitudes, 
and the substitution instances of ‘that p’, ‘to ‘ or ‘X’ their contents. All three 
forms display a hallmark of intentionality, namely that nothing in reality needs 
to correspond to the (grammatical) direct object: one can believe something 
which is not the case, intend to do something which never happens, and love 
someone who does not exist. Prima facie, (I) expresses a relation towards a 
proposition or—sticking to the lingo of ‘attitude’—propositional attitude, (II) a 
relation towards an action or action-oriented attitude, (III) a relation to an object 
or object-oriented attitude. Nonetheless it is customary to subsume all forms of 
intentionality under Russell’s (1912) label ‘propositional attitude’. This is no 
coincidence. There is a pervasive tendency to regard (I) as basic and to disre-
gard other forms of intentionality. 
 In addition, one finds more explicit manifestations of what one might call 
propositionalism about intentional states. Several authors have maintained that 
statements like 
(1) A intends to climb a tree 
(2) A admires Angela Merkel 
(3) A sees the Matterhorn 
(4) A craves M&Ms 
can be analysed into statements of the form 
 
(I) A Vs that p. 
Yet these reductive projects are unprepossessing. 
 McDowell’s (1996) may be right to reject ‘non-conceptual content’, if he 
means to insist that every object we can identify perceptually can somehow be 
described conceptually, perhaps with the additional aid of demonstratives. It 
does not follow, however, that there is a list of propositions which captures pre-
cisely and completely what A perceives when she admires the Matterhorn—the 
content of A’s visual field. 
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 Tugendhat (1976: ch. 6) contends that even those intentional states which 
are ostensibly directed towards objects, for example loving, pitying or admiring 
someone, imply propositional attitudes, attitudes the expression of which in-
volves a that-clause. Although Dorothea Brooke does not exist, I can admire her 
only if I believe that she exists. I beg to differ. There are many literary characters 
that I admire, even though I am fully cognisant of their fictional status. Fur-
thermore, even if action- and object-oriented states uniformly implied or pre-
supposed that-ish states, it would not follow that properly analysed they all are 
logically or semantically equivalent to statements of type I. Tugendhat further 
contends that if I picture Dorothea Brooke to myself as a fictional character, I 
picture her as existing. To be sure, to imagine an apple is not to imagine an 
apple as non-existing, but neither is it the same as to imagine that there is an 
apple, which is what Tugendhat needs to establish. Moreover, it is far from ob-
vious that when I imagine Dorothea Brooke, I imagine her as existing rather 
than as non-existing, provided that either of these options makes sense in the 
first place. 
 Kenny (1963: chs. V, XI) steers a different course to a proximate reductionist 
destination. He maintains that sentences where ‘I want’ is followed by a direct 
object (rather than by an infinitive), as in ‘I want an X’ can often be expanded 
into sentences of the form ‘I want to Φ an X’: I want an apple – I want to eat an 
apple, etc. Furthermore, in reports of what he calls ‘affective attitudes’ the 
grammatical object of the attitude takes a different form depending on the verb: 
either a ‘that’ clause, or an infinitive (I hope that p, I want to Φ; I prefer to Φ, 
etc.). Nonetheless, he maintains, they could all be expressed using the construc-
tion ‘A volits that p’, since he thinks of these affective attitudes as taking an 
attitude to a state of affairs. Although this would not dispense with object-
oriented intentionality in cases other than wanting unaffected, it would mean 
that action-oriented cases could be reduced to that-ish cases, and hence to 
something propositional in form. But it is far from obvious that intending to do 
something is tantamount to wanting a certain state of affairs to obtain. It cer-
tainly requires more than simply voliting that the results of the action come 
about. There is all the difference in the world between A wanting that it be the 
case that A climbs a tree and A seriously intending to climb a tree. Finally, even 
if all statements of the form ‘A wants to Φ’ could be faithfully paraphrased by 
statements of the form ‘A volits that p’, it would not follow that the proposi-
tional construction is more basic. For the possibility of paraphrase cuts both 
ways (Glock 2003: 66-70). And the infinitive construction is much more readily 
understood than Kenny’s propositional alternative. 
 Perhaps the shortcomings of these three reductions could be rectified, and 
perhaps there are other, more plausible, versions of reductionism. However, we 
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should not hold our breath. For reductionism confronts a series of obstacles of 
principle. 
 The first is a generalisation of a point I just invoked against Kenny. Intend-
ing to climb a tree is not the same as desiring to be up the tree plus believing 
that (only) climbing will do the trick. One can do both, without (seriously) in-
tending to climb the tree, e.g. because one shies away from exertion. Arguably, 
someone who knows himself incapable of climbing the tree cannot intend to do 
so, while nonetheless having the appropriate belief / desire combination. To be 
sure, a young child can intend, try and make an effort to jump over its own 
shadow. Yet this is only because the child does not realize that this is impossi-
ble. A cannot intend to do something that A believes or knows to be impossible. 
 Following Searle (1983: 30), one might insist that 
 
(5) A intends to  
must be tantamount to 
 
(5’) A intends that A -s 
The reason is that (5) allows of adverbial modifications of the form 
(6) A intends to  M-ly 
And (6) means 
 
(6’) A intends that A -s M-ly. 
Why? ‘M-ly’ does not modify the intending, it modifies the verb ‘‘. And such a 
verb makes sense only in the context of a sentence. 
 However, the last step is contentious. One might hold that the adverbial 
modification specifies what kind of -ing A intends to perform. Of course, the 
linguistic category verb must be understood ultimately not through the infini-
tive construction on display in ‘A intends to ‘, but through the construction ‘A 
-s’. But it does not follow that it must be analysed in a that-ish manner. 
 The second obstacle concerns intentional states like admiration. Admiring 
Merkel is not tantamount to admiring any particular fact about her. Nor is it 
identical with believing that Merkel is admirable. One may have that belief, yet 
fail to admire her. In fact, I find myself in this situation. I think that Merkel is 
admirable on account of being an astute tactician, on account of having con-
signed to the political dustbin so many macho Christian democrat challengers, 
and on account of how she handled the Euro crisis. And yet, when I try to ad-
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mire her, my toenails start curling, metaphorically speaking, perhaps because 
of my inveterate left-wing leanings and sensibilities. There is an emotional or 
affective aspect to admiration that is not captured by the propositional para-
phrase. 
The third obstacle concerns perception. It is connected to a wide-ranging 
and passionate debate about the idea of non-conceptual content, to which I 
cannot do justice here. But my main concern is this. We need to distinguish 
propositionalism from conceptualism à la McDowell. Perhaps there is no ‘non-
conceptual’ content, that is, no feature of what one sees that cannot somehow 
be conceptualized, described in linguistic terms, if only of an ostensive kind. 
Nevertheless it would not follow that seeing the Matterhorn can be paraphrased 
into a construction of the form ‘seeing that p’. For it would not guarantee that 
there is a list of propositions that captures precisely and completely what A 
perceives—the content of A’s visual field. This much ought to be clear from the 
failure of phenomenalism. 
The final obstacle is once more a generalisation of an objection I raised 
against Kenny. Let us assume that all cases of action-oriented (type II) and ob-
ject-oriented (type III) intentionality could be glossed in terms of that-ish 
(type I) intentionality. Because of the aforementioned symmetry of paraphrase, 
this would not demonstrate that such paraphrases display the underlying logi-
cal form of the analysanda or capture A’s mental reality. In the absence of a 
compelling reduction, however, it is sheer dogmatism to insist that (1) – (4) 
ultimately express attitudes towards propositions. Of course, the reasons people 
have for admiring Merkel or intending to climb a tree can be expressed through 
that-clauses. But so can the reasons people have for kicking a ball, and no one 
would conclude that kicking a ball is therefore anything other than a relation to 
an object. 
3  Against that-ish propositionalism 
Not all theorists of intentionality subscribe to reductionism. In his later writ-
ings, Brentano took the opposite—and in my estimation even less plausible—
view, namely that at the most basic level all intentionality is non that-ish. 
Husserl, Wittgenstein, Dretske and Annette Baier among others, acknowledged 
that intentionality comes in that-ish and non that-ish varieties. But they had 
different reasons, and recognized different non that-ish constructions, such as 
‘A saw B cross the road’ – the naked infinitive, ‘A saw how B -ed’, ‘A saw the 
rabbit as a duck’ and ‘A admired B as a dancer’ (see Mulligan 2013; Glock 2015). 
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 Nevertheless, that-ish intentionality remains of paramount importance. 
Does propositionalism at least hold for all of these cases? My answer is negative. 
Many intentional verbs cannot be characterised as expressing a relation either 
to a proposition or to a sentence.  
 Before arguing this case, we need to dwell on two components in that-ish 
constructions of type (I)—the ‘V-s’ and the ‘that p’. On the one hand, there is the 
intentional verb (‘thinks’, etc.), which informs us, e.g., that A believes, rather 
than, for example, knows or fears that p. On the other hand, there is a noun-
clause (‘that the sun is out’, etc.), which informs us of what it is that A believes, 
the content of her belief, and is therefore known as the content-clause. Switch-
ing to the material mode, there is the kind of intentional state on the one hand, 
the kind of content on the other. These two parameters are in turn connected to 
an equivocation in nouns like ‘belief’, ‘hope’, ‘desire’, etc. ‘A’s belief’ can refer 
either to what A believes, namely that the sun is out, or to A’s believing that the 
sun is out. A’s believing can be erroneous, sensible, or tentative. But what A 
believes—e.g. that the sun is out—i.e. the content of her belief, cannot (White 
1972: 81-3). Conversely, while what A believes can be true or false, A’s believing 
cannot (although A can of course believe truly or falsely).4 
The problem with that-ish propositionalism concerns the relation between 
intentional verb and noun clause. It makes no sense to expect, fear or hope a 
sentence or proposition, at least not the same sense as to expect, fear or hope 
that p. And given that what I can suspect is what you can believe, this difficulty 
may be contagious. That is to say, it may show that even though it makes sense 
to believe the proposition that p, believing that p is not the same as believing 
the proposition that p (see White 1972; Hacker 1992). 
|| 
4 Similarly for ‘statement’: a statement can either be what someone does—namely to perform 
a speech-act—or what someone states. It is customary to speak of an act/product or act/object 
ambiguity, on account of the difference between the judging of something to be the case and 
that which is judged. But while some intentional verbs denote bona fide acts of either a linguis-
tic or mental kind, this does not hold true of long-standing beliefs and desires (see Glock 1996: 
58-63). And the term ‘object’ commits the reification I inveigh against. The term ‘product’ partly 
revokes that reification, yet in an unacceptably metaphorical manner. A doesn’t produce a 
content that p by judging that p; rather, judging that p is a modification of A to be cashed out 
in terms of A’s (physical, linguistic, mental) acts and abilities. Or so I shall argue. Even a me-
ticulous analyst like White puts a foot wrong terminologically. He distinguishes between what 
A believes, namely that p, and what A has, namely the belief that p. But that second locution 
differs from the first only through the apposition of the label ‘belief’. And while it is tempting to 
think that the belief that p is simply what A believes, there is no temptation to hold that the 
believing that p is what A believes.  
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One might respond that in its philosophical usage, ‘proposition’ is a term of 
art which is exempted from the vagaries of certain intentional verbs in English 
that rule out locutions like 
 
(7) A fears/expects/hopes the proposition that p.5 
But this invites the challenge to explain what precisely that technical term 
means. Worse still, because of the illicitness of (7) that challenge cannot be met 
by stipulating that propositions are simply what we believe, expect, hope, etc. 
The denial that what we believe is always a proposition seems to imply, 
however, that in cases in which we do believe the proposition that p, we have 
two beliefs, the belief that p and the belief ‘in’ the proposition that p. The rejec-
tion of that-ish propositionalism seems to engender a kind of double-vision. But 
it is far from clear that believing in the proposition that p actually equates to 
believing the proposition that p. Even leaving this point aside, the appearance of 
double-vision is deceptive. To say that A believes the proposition that p is not to 
ascribe to her a belief in addition to her belief that p. Rather, it is to place her 
belief that p in a certain context or focus. Believing that p is simply a matter of 
believing something to be so, whereas believing the proposition that p is a matter 
of believing something to be true. In the case of simply believing, the focus is on 
how things are or might be, in the case of believing a proposition, on how they 
have or might be stated or believed to be. Interpolating ‘the proposition’ be-
tween ‘believes’ and a that-clause ‘that p’ is appropriate only if a proposition—a 
sentence or statement—is already in circulation or at least in the air (see Rundle 
2001). In switching from ‘A believes that p’ to ‘A believes the proposition that p’ 
we do not maintain the presence of an additional belief; rather, we redescribe 
the original belief in a particular way. 
4  Against the building-block model 
One might grant that what we believe is not always a proposition, while none-
theless insisting that believing that p is a relation to a content referred to by the 
content-clause. That much is taken for granted even by nonconceptualists, who 
deny that all intentional states are relations to propositions. I challenge this 
|| 
5 In the sorely missed St. John’s College discussion group at Oxford, Peter Strawson once tried 
to assuage nominalist qualms by insisting: ‘"Proposition" is just a term of art.’ To which Bede 
Rundle replied: ‘Yes, one of the black arts!’ 
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shared assumption. My first step is to reject the building-block model of con-
tents. According to this model what a subject believes (the content of A’s belief) 
is a proposition or thought, a complex (abstract) object of which concepts are 
the components; thus the thought that dogs bark is a complex abstract object of 
which the concepts DOG and BARK are abstract parts. By a similar token, A’s 
state of believing is a mental process of accepting the whole proposition, and 
thinking one of the component concepts is a stage in this process; thus to be-
lieve that dogs bark, A must think DOG and think BARK. In summary, if A be-
lieves that p, then she stands in a relation of grasping and accepting an abstract 
entity, a proposition, of which concepts are (equally abstract) components. It 
follows that one cannot grasp or accept the whole proposition without having or 
grasping its constituent concepts. 
 Its popularity notwithstanding, however, the building-block model is prob-
lematic. There are both empirical and conceptual qualms about the idea that 
entertaining a part of a thought correlates with a definite stage of a more pro-
tracted mental or neurophysiological process—the entertaining or judging of the 
whole thought. As Wittgenstein remarked: ‘Thought and intention are neither 
‘articulated’ nor ‘non-articulated’; to be compared neither with a single note 
which sounds during the acting or speaking, nor with a melody’ (1967: 217). 
Without mentioning this passage, Künne complements the musical analogy by 
its positive counterpart:  
... the complexity of a judgment is not like that of a melody but rather like that of a chord. 
In judging that the moon is round you simultaneously exercise your ability to think of the 
moon and your ability to attribute roundness. In this respect episodic thinking is different 
from saying. (1996: 75) 
Even in a relatively complex judgement, the subject exercises several concep-
tual capacities at once rather than sequentially. This is yet another respect in 
which even episodic thinking differs from saying, the case on which it is mod-
elled by the building-block position. 
Even if these points could be waived, we would only be dealing with stages 
of thinking a thought (of believing that p), not with stages of thoughts (of what is 
believed, namely that p). As regards the latter, the building-block model trans-
poses the part/whole relation from the spatial and temporal sphere to a 
sphere—that of abstract entities—to which, ex hypothesi, neither spatial nor 
temporal notions apply. What seems to give sense to talk of parts and wholes in 
the case of propositions or thoughts is the fact that the linguistic expressions of 
thoughts—namely sentences—have components—namely words (see Kenny 
1989: 126–7). What is said or thought has genuine components to the extent to 
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which its linguistic expression has components. These ‘conceptual components’ 
are, for instance, what A explains when A is called upon to explain what she 
has asserted (queried, etc.) through the utterance of a sentence composed of 
words expressing the concepts concerned. 
 A final objection to the building-block model is what Künne (2008: 179-82) 
calls the repetition problem, noted yet not solved by Bolzano. By contrast to 
Bolzano and Künne, let us contemplate the problem with respect to proposi-
tions rather than complex concepts. How many concepts occur in this ‘content’? 
 
(8) The aunt of my uncle knows the uncle of my aunt 
Irrespective of how the concepts involved in a proposition are ultimately to be 
individuated and counted, the appropriate answer does not double-count aunt 
and uncle. This displays a significant difference between the ‘content’ on the 
one hand and a bona fide complex object like the (token-) sentence (8) or a bona 
fide sequence of occurrences like the utterance of (8). The concepts aunt and 
uncle are not quasi-spatial or quasi-temporal parts of genuine wholes; rather, 
they are principles of intellectual operations that are employed in dual capacities 
by a subject who thinks that the aunt of her uncle knows the uncle of her aunt 
(see Glock 2010).  
5  Against the relational model 
When a human adult believes that p, the concepts expressed by the components 
of ‘p’ are involved not sequentially; rather, the subject exercises several concep-
tual capacities at once. This paves the way for challenging the final component 
of lingualist reasoning, namely the relational model. Even in the linguistic case, 
A’s thinking that p is not a bona fide relation between A and an object that p, 
whether abstract or concrete. Talk of ‘propositional attitudes’ is misguided not 
just on account of ‘propositional’, as Quineans would have us believe, but also 
or even primarily on account of ‘attitudes’. For the idea that belief is a relation 
between a subject and an entity amounts to a reification of what we think (be-
lieve or desire to be the case). 
 My case for this verdict starts with two features of our intentional verbs that 
do not fit the relational model. The first concerns the intensionality of thought. 
According to a mainstream going back to Frege, in statements of type (I) inten-
tional verbs invariably create intensional contexts. If we substitute co-
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referential terms within the content-clause, this may lead from a true attribution 
like 
 
(9) Sarah believes that Cicero was Roman 
to a false one like 
 
(10) Sarah believes that Tully was Roman. 
The main dissenting voice is that of direct reference theorists harking back to 
Russell’s account of propositions. They insist that if (9) is true, (10) must be as 
well, even if Sarah fervently repudiates the belief attributed to her.6 
Both positions are predicated on the relational model: there must be a defi-
nite answer to the question of whether (9) and (10) are true; and that answer 
depends on what kind of entity Sarah is related to – a Fregean proposition con-
sisting of modes of presentations or a Russellian one consisting of objects and 
properties. If we look at our actual practice of belief attributions, however, both 
positions come up wanting. They ignore the context-sensitivity of belief attribu-
tions. We can sometimes but not always report Sarah’s belief in terms that run 
counter to those she would accept herself, contrary, respectively, to Fregeanism 
and Russellianism. The limits of substitution within the content-clause are not 
dictated by an entity—a propositional content—but vary according to the com-
municative situation. 
 Let me illustrate this context-sensitivity. 
 
(11) Sarah thinks that the old fool is adorable 
|| 
6 They are prone to reason as follows. If ‘Sam believes that Cicero was a Roman orator’ is true 
then so is ‘Sam believes that Tully was a Roman orator’, even if Sam fervently repudiates the 
belief attributed to him. Appearances to the contrary arise only because the second belief 
attribution carries the conversational implicatures that Sam would assent to ‘Tully was a Ro-
man orator’ or to a sentence with the same content (since Sam might not speak English). How-
ever, apprised of these circumstances most competent speakers would reject the second attri-
bution as downright false rather than misleading. Furthermore, they entertain no thoughts 
whatever about the relation between belief and propositional contents expressible in a miscel-
lany of natural languages; consequently, when uttering or hearing ‘Sam believes that Tully was 
a Roman orator’ they certainly do not insinuate or pick up the implicatures imputed to them. 
For objections to Fregeanism that are not based on this equally dogmatic Russellian alternative 
see Kenny 1975: 51; Rundle 1997: 83; Wettstein 2004: chs. 8-9. 
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can be uttered without presupposing that the subject would assent to ‘The old 
fool is adorable’. This even goes for content-clauses that the subject could not 
use. We can say 
 
(12)  Sarah thinks that the old fool will give her a biscuit 
even if Sarah is an animal or a child that lacks the concepts of a fool and of a 
biscuit.  
 Even within a single content-clause we can speak for the subject, the 
speaker and the hearer. Consider the following pair of sentences: 
 
(13) Sarah believes that Bishop Berkeley is buried in Oxford Cathedral 
(14) Sarah believes that the author of the Principles is interred in Christchurch 
Chapel. 
I may be speaking of the author of the Principles because Sarah has just read the 
Principles yet has no other knowledge about Berkeley, of Christchurch Chapel 
because that is how I relate to this building as an atheist with an Oxford degree, 
of interment because my interlocutor is a pretentious public school boy who 
takes pride in educated terminology, and so on. 
 It might be granted that such reports are common and perhaps even un-
avoidable, but that we tailor them to our audience for the pragmatic reason of 
facilitating communication. Strictly speaking, the objection runs, we would 
regard them as mistaken unless they capture the subject’s mental reality. But 
even if this were so, it would not reinstate the relational model in its Fregean 
incarnation. To say what someone believes is not to relate her to an entity but to 
speak for the subject on the question at hand, whether or not the subject itself is 
in a position to do likewise. This can be brought out by noting that most compe-
tent speakers would find it perfectly acceptable to analyse (11) in a parenthetical 
fashion, e.g. as 
 
(11’) The old fool is adorable (Sarah believes) 
And they would certainly not hit on the idea that the acceptability of such a 
paraphrase depends on what sort of abstract entity Sarah is related to.  
My second argument against the relational model concerns a contrast be-
tween attributions of thought and genuine relational statements. Admittedly, 
noun-clauses like ‘that the cat went up the oak tree’ or ‘what Carl believes’ are 
grammatically speaking the objects of beliefs. But they are intentional rather 
than object-accusatives (White 1972). The difference can be illustrated by look-
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ing at the difference between believing someone—a person—on the one hand 
and believing something—something a subject does or could think or say – on 
the other. 
 
(15) Angela Merkel believes Barack Obama 
entails that there is an object x such that Merkel believes x. In (15) the psycho-
logical verb expresses a genuine relation, since here two relata must exist, one 
to believe, and one to be believed. By contrast, 
 
(16) Angela Merkel believes that the NSA will stop spying on her 
does not entail that there is an object x such that Merkel believes x. Nothing in 
reality need correspond to the noun-phrase of (16), since the relevant state of 
affairs need not exist or obtain.7 
A defender of the building-block model might dig his heels in and insist 
that at least in cases like (16) something must exist, namely a propositional 
content which is a real object, albeit an abstract one. But this ‘something’ is a 
grammatical projection from that-clauses rather than a genuine object.8 Bren-
tano was right to insist that to believe is to believe something. (16) entails that 
there is something Merkel believes. Yet in the first instance this simply means 
that Merkel cannot believe anything unless there is an intelligible answer to the 
question ‘What does Merkel believe?’. Furthermore, the what-clause ‘what 
Merkel believes’, like ‘what Merkel weighs’, incorporates an interrogative rather 
than a relative pronoun. Thus ‘Hollande knows the person Merkel believes’ and 
‘The person Merkel believes is Obama’ together entail ‘Hollande knows Obama‘. 
Yet ‘Hollande knows what Angela Merkel believes’ and ‘What Merkel believes is 
that the NSA will stop spying on her’ do not entail ‘Hollande knows that the 
NSA will stop spying on Merkel’, if only because one cannot know a falsehood. 
|| 
7 In discussion, Kevin Mulligan put it to me that ‘A believes B’ is to be analysed as ‘A believes 
B to be F’, with ‘F’ meaning something like trustworthy, sincere, reliable. But even if that is 
correct, and even if the latter is in turn to be analysed that-ishly as ‘A believes that B is F’ (a 
step Mulligan does not take), the difference I invoke remains intact. For the latter does not 
hinge on whether or not ‘Merkel believes Obama’ might be reduced to a case involving ‘Merkel 
believes that p’, but that it presupposes the existence of Obama. That much must be preserved 
even in any that-ish analysis, otherwise the latter is just wrong. 
8 Pace Quine, the term ‘something’ is wider than ‘object’. ‘Something’ is syntactically tran-
scategorial: it can quantify into the positions of singular term, predicate, and sentence. Only in 
the first case is it equivalent to ‘object’ (Glock 2003: 52-63). 
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Similarly, ‘Hollande knows what Merkel weighs’ and ‘Merkel weighs 70 kg’ do 
not entail ‘Hollande knows 70kg’, since that sentence is ungrammatical. Neither 
‘what Merkel weighs’ nor ‘what Merkel believes’ signify an object to which 
Merkel is related. By the same token, believing that p is no more a genuine rela-
tion to an object than weighing n kilograms.9 
It might be objected that there are pertinent contexts in which ‘what Merkel 
believes’ incorporates a relative pronoun. In conjunction with (16) 
 
(17) Hollande believes what Merkel believes  
entails 
 
(18) Hollande believes that the NSA will stop spying on Merkel. 
But (18) is not underwritten by our knowledge that Merkel and Hollande are 
related in the same way to an entity beyond space and time, whatever that 
might mean. It is underwritten by the fact that both share certain properties 
regarding a particular question, namely the question of whether the NSA will 
stop spying on Merkel. Even in this context, ‘what Merkel believes’ is an inter-
rogative clause in a less direct sense, since its sense derives from the way in 
which Merkel would or could respond to a certain question, or react in certain 
situations, e.g. when it comes to raising the tapping scandal in a meeting with 
Obama. 
That different people A and B can think the same thought or hold the same 
belief does not mean that there is an abstract object to which they severally 
stand in the relation of thinking, believing, saying, etc. It just means that both A 
and B believe that snow is white; that is to say, what they both believe can be 
expressed by the same declarative sentence. If A and B are to disagree, what A 
says or asserts must be what B denies. But this does not commit one to the exis-
tence of self-subsistent entities beyond space and time, but only to the concep-
tual truism that if B denies what A asserts, and A asserts that p, then B denies 
that p. 
The measurement analogy does not just pinpoint a weakness in the build-
ing-block model, it also supports the capacity alternative that I call the ‘capacity 
approach’ (Glock 2013a). When we ascribe a weight to a material object, we do 
not ascribe to it a genuine relation to an abstract object. Rather, we ascribe to it 
|| 
9 For the measurement analogy, see Davidson 2001: 60, 75, 214-8; Beckermann 1996; Mat-
thews 2007. 
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a relation to other material objects, for instance that of being in balance with a 
cube which contains 60 litres of water. Mutatis mutandis for the case of belief. In 
ascribing a belief to a subject A, we ultimately describe and explain their actual 
or possible behaviour. We place A not in a relation to a genuine object, but in 
the context of a system of describing and explaining A’s behaviour and behav-
ioural capacities. Accordingly, a subject can believe something to be the case 
without standing in a relation to a ‘content’ and hence without running through 
or even possessing the concepts which feature in the content-clause we use to 
ascribe the belief.  
6  An unnoticed contrast 
The concepts of content and representation are two of the most important con-
cepts in contemporary cognitive sciences, and pivotal to representationalism. 
They are also usually regarded as tightly related - hence the label ‘representa-
tional content’. There are two possibilities regarding the relation between repre-
sentation and content. Representational contents could be 
Representanda: representational content is represented, i.e. X represents con-
tent C. 
Representantia: representational content represents, i.e. content C represents Y. 
Both options have enjoyed widespread support. Here are two instances of the 
idea that content is represented: 
‘one can represent a content doxastically’ (Chalmers 2004: 155) 
‘if a mental representation M represents a content C’ (Prinz 2006: 441). 
The opposing view, according to which content represents, is adopted in these 
two passages: 
‘the way a given content represents it [the world] as being’ (Brewer 2006: 173) 
‘intentional content that represents the world’ (Martin 1992: 745). 
The schism carries over to the two types of content commonly distinguished—
concepts on the one hand, propositions on the other. Here are two examples of 
the idea that concepts are representanda: 
‘Consider a simulator that represents the concept of bicycle.’ (Barsalou 2009: 
1282) 
‘the brain represents concepts’ (Binder and Desai 2011: 528). 
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And here are two cases of the opinion that concepts are representantia:  
‘Concepts represent, stand in for, or refer to things other than themselves.’ 
(Prinz 2004: 3) 
‘concepts represent whatever they do precisely in virtue of these roles.’ (Aydede 
2010). 
Turning finally to propositions, the following authors regard them as represen-
tanda: 
‘The human [...] mentally represents a proposition in thought.’ (Currie 1980: 247) 
‘thinking that p requires representing the proposition that p.’ (Cummins 1996: 3). 
By contrast, these authors treat them as representantia:  
‘the states of affairs which the proposition represents’ (Faulkner 1998: 307) 
‘the proposition represents the world’ (King 1995: 517). 
The existence of these two options would seem rather obvious. Astonishingly, 
however, the difference between them has rarely been noted.10 To my knowl-
edge, the first one to plot it systematically is Kevin Reuter (2014), to whom I owe 
the quotations listed above. I fully concur with Reuter that the difference be-
tween the two options is of central importance to the conceptual framework of 
cognitive science, at least in the representationalist tradition. At the same time, 
I do not share his view that the two options stand in tension, and that they have 
not been combined. Reuter writes:  
While this is certainly a theoretical possibility, there does not seem to be a single author 
who holds such a position explicitly. … Another reason for rejecting this possibility is that 
if it were true, at least one of the readings of representation would not retain its original 
meaning because it would not be compatible with commonsense: People do not seem to 
claim that x is about or means c which itself is about or means y, e.g. a fairy tale does not 
seem to be about a certain content that is itself about dragons and tigers... (2014: 4) 
I applaud taking commonsense cum ordinary discourse into the equation (con-
trary to the contempt in which both are foolishly held by a majority of contem-
porary cognitive scientists). But the incompatibility between commonsense on 
the one hand and thinking that contents are both representanda and represen-
tatia that Reuter diagnoses is an artifice resulting from his terminology. 
|| 
10 But see Glock 2009: 23-9, which documents how Fodor and some of his disciples waver 
between the two options in the case of concepts. 
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 Like Reuter, I accept that one cannot say of a sentence that it is about a con-
tent. Unlike him, I hold that there is an antecedent incompatibility between 
ordinary discourse and the very locution that a sentence or text means that p, 
irrespective of whether the latter is regarded as a content (Glock 2003: 154-5). 
However, if we avail ourselves of the idiom of representation in the first place, 
we next need to distinguish various ways in which X might be said to represent 
Y. Being about or meaning Y are only two of several options. X can also repre-
sent Y in the sense of expressing Y. And a sentence or text—fairy tales included—
can certainly express ‘a content’, e.g. that once upon a time there was a cruel 
king with a benevolent and intelligent daughter … Furthermore, that content 
might be said to present the world as being a certain way, namely such that 
once upon a time …. Finally, at least in the case of non-fictional sentences and 
texts, the expressed content might be said to be about something in reality (an 
object, event, etc.). 
Reuter’s further conjecture that as a matter of fact no one has ever know-
ingly combined the representanda and representantia options is mistaken. 
(Neo-)Fregeans like Peacocke and Künne hold, consistently if perhaps not cor-
rectly, that concepts and propositions are at the same time representanda of the 
predicates and sentences of public languages and representantia—modes of 
presentation—of, respectively, properties and states of affairs (see Glock 2009: 
28n). Thus, according to Künne concepts qua modes of presentation are ‘repre-
sentational abstract entities’ (2007: 346-7). This proposal must not be confused 
with Fodor’s subjectivism, which has it that concepts are mental particulars and 
predicates of a neurophysiologically implemented language of thought. Qua 
modes of presentation concepts are not predicates of a language of thought. 
Instead, they are at the same time representanda of the predicates of public 
languages and representantia of properties. 
Künne distinguishes between application, connotation and expression: the 
general term ‘dog’ applies to all and only dogs, connotes the property of being a 
dog, and expresses the concept of being a dog (2005: 254, 263 and fn. 31; see 
also Künne 2003: 4). By this token, concepts are representanda of general terms 
in the sense of being expressed by them. At the same time they are representan-
tia, in that they ‘determine’ properties. Reuter’s incompatibility thesis neverthe-
less contains an important kernel of truth. It is hard to see how contents in gen-
eral or concepts and propositions in particular could both be represented and 
represent in the very same sense. 
Once this point is acknowledged, what are we to make of positions that 
deny either that contents are represented or that contents represent? In the 
presentation from which his paper was derived, Reuter ascribed to the former 
camp the following line of reasoning: ‘no one doubts that people represent the 
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world by using concepts. If content is constituted by concepts, and if concepts 
represent the world, then it follows that content represents things in the 
world’11. Reuter condones neither this stance nor the argument; and he is well 
advised to do so. The argument is a petitio. The point of agreement between the 
two camps is that content is constituted by concepts. Whether propositions and 
concepts represent the world is precisely the bone of contention. Even if people 
represent the world by using concepts, it does not follow that concepts repre-
sent the world, but merely that they are employed in representing the world. 
Finally, denying that propositional contents are representanda is at odds with a 
core claim of representationalism, namely the relational model. If thinking is a 
matter of standing in a relation of representing, then in 
 
(19) A thinks that p 
the content that p must be represented, namely by the subject A, or by one of 
A’s mental states of thinking. 
Can one deny that contents are representantia? Once more representation-
alism would seem to rule this out. For contents are supposed to represent the 
world by having semantic properties. That is the very point of speaking about 
them as representations or representational contents. By this token, proposi-
tions represent the world by having truth-conditions, i.e. being true under cer-
tain circumstances and false under others; and concepts represent the world by 
having satisfaction conditions, i.e. being instantiated by objects possessing 
certain properties and not being instantiated by objects lacking these properties 
(see sect. 7 below). 
To wrap up this section, let me venture a guess as to why the contrast has 
been largely ignored, and why many authors oscillate between the two options 
in a way that is confusing at best and incoherent at worst. I shall restrict myself 
to the case of propositions, in which the temptation is most transparent. It arises 
from the fact that noun-clauses in general and that-clauses in particular are 
systematically ambiguous in the following sense. One and the same that-clause 
can designate both what A believes or desires—the propositional content–and 
the state of affairs which, respectively, verifies A’s belief or satisfies A’s desire. If 
A’s belief is true or her desire satisfied, the that-clause designates not just a 
possible state of affairs, but an obtaining state of affairs, i.e. a fact. This leads to 
the idea that there is something that stands in or mediates between A or A’s 
|| 
11 See his abstract at http://www.sfb991.uni-duesseldorf.de/fileadmin/Vhosts/SFB991/ 
a02/CC_Broschuere_final3.pdf 
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believing/desiring on the one hand, and the world—a state of affairs or fact. 
Propositional contents appear as representanda if one focuses on the relation 
between A or A’s believing and what A believes; propositional contents appear 
as representatia if one focuses on the relation between what A believes and the 
way the world is or might be, between what A believes and what is the case if A 
believes truly; and mutatis mutandis for desires. But the idea of such a shadowy 
entity between the subject, her thinking or speaking on the one hand and the 
world is misguided. Wittgenstein’s reflections on intentionality provide one set 
of reasons for thinking so (see Glock 1996: 184-9), my animadversions above are 
designed to provide another. 
7  Against representationalism 
We are now in a position to appreciate that there is a fundamental flaw in the 
language of thought hypothesis and a more general problem with the idea that 
concepts or propositions are representations. Following Peirce’s theory of signs 
(1933), one can distinguish between different types of representation:  
Icons resemble what they represent 
Symbols are related to what they represent by convention 
Indices are connected to what they ‘represent’ by causal dependencies or by 
other natural relations such as spatial or temporal proximity. 
Thus realist paintings are icons of what they represent. Linguistic expressions, 
with the possible exception of onomatopoetic ones, are symbols of what they 
represent. The word ‘dog’, for example, is connected to the animals not through 
any kind of resemblance, but through an arbitrary convention. Smoke, finally, 
is an index of fire, because it is a causal result of fire. 
Given this distinction, one might deliver the following brief verdict on the 
idea of a neurophysiological language of thought: 
– Patterns of neural firings are certainly indices of external phenomena, but 
only for observers with neurophysiological measuring equipment, not for 
ordinary subjects of thought; 
– they might be icons (but are not); 
– they cannot be symbols. 
That neural firings are causal results of external events and causal precondi-
tions of perception is agreed on all sides. The extent to which there is, for exam-
ple, a spatial resemblance between the objects of perception and the neural 
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activities that underlie perception, is a matter for empirical investigation. For 
the most part, no such iconic relation has been observed. Although experiments 
like those of Hubel and Wiesel show that particular neurons are involved in 
seeing lines of a particular orientation, there is no iconic similarity between the 
lines and the pattern of firing neurons. Finally, neural firings cannot be symbols 
because there is no one who uses them to represent anything in a conventional 
manner (a point to which I shall return). Consequently, there can be no mental 
symbols and hence no language of thought. 
What about the more general idea that concepts are representations? Ac-
cording to an orthodoxy shared by RTM, concepts must be shareable because 
they are components of what subjects believe and desire, of shareable thoughts 
or propositional contents. But acknowledging that different subjects can share a 
concept is incompatible with maintaining that they are particulars in the heads 
of individuals. Furthermore, as their components, concepts are in the first in-
stance no more representations or signs than propositions themselves. They are 
what is represented—in the sense of being expressed by general terms and em-
ployed by subjects. They are the content of thinking, not what represents, i.e. 
what expresses these contents (Glock 2009: 23-9). 
This lesson is in line with the common sense view that concepts are ex-
pressed by signs such as predicates or logical operators. It also follows from a 
more basic feature of the notion of representation. Bona fide representations, 
that is, those of an iconic or symbolic kind, require a medium. That is to say, 
they have representational properties by virtue of having non-representational 
properties. For instance, Rembrandt’s self-portrait in the National Gallery of 
Scotland represents a particular individual on account of more basic properties, 
roughly the way in which it arranges colours and shapes (see Hyman 2006). 
Similarly, the sign-token ‘Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn’ signifies that same 
individual on account of its typographic properties, which are subject to the 
kind of conventions characteristic of symbols. 
The idea that thoughts and concepts are (mental, computational or neural) 
representations is incompatible with this defining feature of representations. 
With apologies to Marshall McLuhan, thoughts—and by implication concepts—
are all message and no medium! (Hacker 2010: 282n). Or, with rather fewer 
apologies to Wittgenstein, thought is not a linguistic symbol requiring interpre-
tation; it is itself ‘the last interpretation’ (1958: 34). 
But couldn’t Fodor respond that concepts and propositions qua sign-types 
of Mentalese do occur in a medium, namely of neural firings? The latter repre-
sent propositional or conceptual contents on account of their non-
representational physiological or physical properties. According to Fodor, for 
instance, these representations have certain syntactic properties—properties 
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determining the way they are processed—on account of their physiological 
qualities, and they have certain semantic properties, properties determining 
what they represent, on account of their causal relations to the environment. 
At this juncture, the epistemic or cognitive dimension of representations 
comes into play. The non-representational properties of representations must be 
accessible to the subject of representation. After all, a representation R is not 
just a sign of something—an object O, but a sign for someone—a subject of repre-
sentation A—someone to whom X is represented through R (again, the point 
was epitomized by Peirce, in his famous semiotic triangle). Yet neural tokens of 
computational types are entirely and in principle inaccessible to the subject, 
they are ‘deeply unconscious’, to use Searle’s (1997) critical label. By the same 
token, they cannot be used by A intentionally or, a fortiori, with the intent to 
represent anything. Nor can the subject employ them according to rules, as 
required for symbolic representation. 
There is possible defence of RTM: neural signs may not be employed by per-
sonal subjects, but they can nonetheless be employed by sub-personal subjects, 
e.g. by the brain, its parts, or functionally defined modules.12 But this response 
invites the charge of a ‘homunculus’ or ‘mereological fallacy’ (Kenny 1984: ch. 
9; Bennett/Hacker 2003). This is the fallacy of explaining mental attributes of an 
animal or subject—in our case the capacity for conceptual thought—by postulat-
ing sub-personal subjects—homunculi—with the same or similar mental capaci-
ties—in this case the capacity for the intentional employment of signs. The ex-
planation is fallacious because these capacities can only be attributed to the 
animal or subject A as a whole, and not—save metaphorically—to its parts, 
whether they be organs like A’s brain or capacities like A’s mind. Furthermore, 
even if it made sense to credit sub-personal instances with symbolic under-
standing, this would only push back the problem. One then needs to explain the 
representational capacities of these postulated homunculi, which engenders a 
regress. 
Yet surely, to anyone except die-hard behaviourists the very existence of 
cognitive phenomena shows that there are mental representations! Doesn’t 
thought require some kind of representation? The answer is yes, but only if 
‘representation’ is divested from the standard connection with a medium and 
understood in a minimalist sense. On that understanding, our thoughts are rep-
|| 
12 Fodor himself does not fall back on this response. He grants that ‘nobody ever interprets 
mental representations’ (2008: 16). Yet this concession removes any license for holding that 
these representations are symbolic, and hence for speaking about a language of thought.  
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resentations, simply because they have what are nowadays called semantic 
properties: 
a proposition that p is true or false 
a singular thought or description a refers or fails to refer to an object x 
a concept F applies or doesn’t apply to an object x. 
 
However, representations in this minimalist sense cannot explain thought. For 
to represent (that p or x or Fs or things being F) in this sense simply is to think 
(to think that p, about x, about Fs, or about things being F).13 Representational-
ism is reduced to uninformative claims like: 
to think that a is F is to represent a as being F, and to think of Fs qua Fs is to 
represent Fs, etc. 
The capacity approach, by contrast, at least holds the promise of a genuine 
explanation. Not a causal explanation of the phylo- or ontogenesis of the capac-
ity for thought, to be sure, or of the proximal (neurophysiological) mechanisms 
that constitute its vehicle. In that capacity, capacities are out of their depth, as 
Molière and Nietzsche (1886: §11), among others, observed. The appeal to pow-
ers instead promises a conceptual explanation of what thought amounts to: 
what it is to think that p or about Fs as Fs is spelled out in terms of the posses-
sion of certain cognitive and conative abilities. In short: the appeal to potentiali-
ties may be bad cognitive science, yet nonetheless good philosophy of mind.14  
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